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A troubling new political economy of geographical intelligence emerged in the United 
States over the last two decades. The contours of this new political economy are difficult to 
identify due to official policies keeping much relevant information secret. The US 
intelligence community increasingly relies on private corporations, working as contractors, 
to undertake intelligence work, including geographical intelligence (formally known as 
GEOINT). In this paper we first describe the geography intelligence “contracting nexus” 
consisting of tens of thousands of companies (including those in the GIS and mapping 
sector), universities and non-profits receiving Department of Defense and intelligence 
agency funding. Second, we discuss the “knowledge nexus” to conceptualize the way 
geographical knowledge figures in current US intelligence efforts, themselves part of the 
US’s war on terror and counterinsurgency (COIN). To analyze the contracting nexus we 
compiled and examined extensive data on military and intelligence contracts, especially 
those contracts awarded by the country’s premier geographical intelligence agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) for satellite data. To analyze the knowledge 
nexus we examined recent changes in the type of geographical knowledges enrolled in and 
produced by the US intelligence community. We note a shift from an emphasis on areal and 
cultural expertise to a focus on calculative predictive spatial analysis in geographical 
intelligence. Due to a lack of public oversight and accountability, the new political economy 
of geographical intelligence is not easy to research, yet there are reasons to be troubled by 
it and the violent surveillant state it supports.  
Keywords 
Geographical intelligence, GEOINT, government contracting, geographical knowledge, 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
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Two events in 2012 provide entry points into the emerging political economy of 
geographical intelligence in the United States. First, in May two companies, little known to 
the public but then worth a combined $1.23 billion in market capitalization, tendered 
hostile bids to buy each other. After the bids were initially rejected, in July the companies 
agreed to merge, which they did January 30, 2013. The companies, GeoEye and 
DigitalGlobe, have been the two key commercial providers of satellite imagery to the United 
States Intelligence Community (IC) and will now operate as a monopoly contractor to the 
IC, known as DigitalGlobe (trading as “DGI” with a $2.2 billion market capitalization). 
Second, it was revealed that the Bush administration began—and the Obama 
administration expanded—the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) to attack 
targets based on “pattern of life” or “signature strike” analysis using surveillance and 
geographical intelligence to kill or capture targets.1 The new “kill/capture” policy 
supersedes previous policies, under which only positively identified targets who appeared 
on secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
lists could be attacked (Entous, Gorman and Barnes, 2012; Frontline, 2011). 
These two developments are part of a huge political economy of geographical intelligence 
contracting that has barely been examined by scholars. The United States government 
spends nearly $80 billion a year on intelligence alone, employs hundreds of thousands of 
personnel and contractors, and has issued over one million Top Secret security clearances 
to contractors. The Department of Defense (DOD), which has a FY2013 budget of $633 
billion, has made contracts with over 50,000 companies since 2000. Private corporations 
are embedded in the IC so much that stock prices of companies producing remote sensing 
and geospatial data are monitored by Congress. Indeed, three quarters of the imagery 
utilized by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) derives from non-
government or commercial sources. Geographical knowledges are also deeply embedded in 
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the IC, playing a key role in the intelligence that enables kill/capture. This article casts light 
on the often shadowy world of intelligence contracting and details the role geography plays 
in its enablement. 
Obstacles to scholarship on intelligence include the lack of public oversight in the world of 
intelligence and  pronounced governmental efforts to prosecute unauthorized disclosures 
(“leaks”). Nonetheless, geographers are well positioned to contribute to a critical analysis 
of the political economy of intelligence in the contemporary US. First, our discipline is not 
confined to the world of academe, as geographers find opportunities to apply their skills in 
a range of governmental and military agencies, and in a rapidly expanding world of private 
contracting companies dedicated to gathering and analyzing intelligence. Second, 
geographical knowledge is increasingly central to intelligence and the intelligence 
community; this has resulted in the military enrolling and redefining the very tools, 
methods and concepts that form the heart of our discipline. 
Scant literature exists on contemporary geographical intelligence and contracting. Sources 
include industry newspapers (e.g., Jones 2011), Congressional testimony (e.g., Dugan, 
2011), documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (e.g., 
NGA, 2009, 2010), and declassified documents (e.g., CIA, 2004). Consequently, researchers 
have preferred historical studies where there is more likelihood of records being 
declassified. Examples of research investigating relevant aspects of the Cold War include 
Cloud’s work on the secret CORONA satellite program (Cloud 2001, 2006) and Farish’s rich 
description of the militarization of geographical knowledge (Farish, 2010, see also Barnes, 
2006; Barnes and Crampton, 2011). 
Trends in military contracting in general have received some attention from scholars 
(Bruneau, 2011; Singer 2003; Stanger 2009; Vitale, 2011). Geographers were major 
contributors to a critical literature on the regional implications of defense spending and 
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contracting that developed in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently Pinkerton, Young and 
Dodds (2011) have provided critical analyses of defense contracting. Adding to this 
literature is Gallaher’s pioneering research on private military contractors (Gallaher, 
2012). Such work brings into question the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 
position that a bright line should be maintained between “inherently governmental” 
activities and permissibly contracted activities (Gale, 2011; Voelz, 2009) and highlights the 
prevalence of cost overruns and financial malfeasance on the part of contractors (Shorrock, 
2008). 
There is also a small but growing body of work that critically examines the current 
relationship between geographical knowledge and changes underway in military strategy 
(Belcher, 2012; Farish and Vitale, 2011; Flint and Bernazzoli, 2009; Flint et al., 2009; Kirsch 
and Flint eds., 2011; Woodward, 2005), with some recent excellent analyses focusing on 
drone warfare (Adey et al., 2011; Anderson, 2011; Gregory, 2011; Shaw, 2012; Shaw and 
Akhter, 2012; Williams, 2011), but this literature has not offered a sustained analysis of the 
role of intelligence or of the intelligence community. The literature that connects state 
practices of security and violence, while offering incisive analyses of geographical aspects 
of these themes, has not yet considered intelligence (Cowen and Gilbert eds., 2008; Fluri, 
2011; Ingram and Dodds, eds., 2009). Research linking the geopolitical and the 
geoeconomic also has not systematically analyzed intelligence (Roberts, Secor and Sparke, 
2003; Cowen and Smith, 2009). Our analysis seeks to extend insights drawn from these 
diverse literatures to critically analyze contemporary currents reshaping the political 
economy of US intelligence.  
In this article we document the political economy of geographical intelligence in the 
contemporary US. We focus on the intelligence community and pay particular attention to 
the key role of geographical intelligence, designated formally as GEOINT, in the prosecution 
of America’s war on terror and counterinsurgency (COIN). Our discussion covers two main 
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interrelated facets of the political economy of the US intelligence community. These are the 
nexus of contracting between government and corporations; and the parallel nexus of 
knowledge between academic production of geographical knowledge and the intelligence 
community. We provide our interpretation and analysis of IC geographical intelligence 
contracting, focusing on the NGA, and one particularly significant 2010 contract known as 
EnhancedView, awarded to GeoEye and DigitalGlobe. We then examine recent policy and 
doctrinal shifts toward an increased enrollment of geographical knowledge within the 
military and the IC, focusing on the spatial analysis of data being generated by aerial 
sensors. 
The Intelligence Community (IC) 
In the United States there are 16 member agencies of the intelligence community, 
comprising about 100,000 “core” governmental personnel (Negroponte, 2006) overseen by 
the Office of the National Director of Intelligence (ODNI).2 Some members of the IC are well 
known, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). Some became better known after 11 September 2001 (hereinafter “9/11”), including 
the National Security Agency (NSA). Some remain almost unknown, such as the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established in 1961 but declassified only in 1992 (Richelson, 
1998). The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) quietly provides geographic 
intelligence, including that mobilized in the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden. The NRO, 
NGA, CIA, and NSA work on national interests, including the design, launching and 
operation of surveillance (“spy”) satellites (NRO), the production and analysis of GEOINT 
(NGA), the collection of human intelligence and covert actions (CIA), and the interception 
and decryption of signals, emails and phone calls (NSA). Some IC members operate solely 
as military service intelligence organizations while others are in the civilian sector (such as 
Homeland Security or the FBI). The CIA is an example of an IC agency that operates in both 
civilian and military spheres; the 60 percent of its officers who have joined the agency since 
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9/11 increasingly focus on counterterrorism and secret drone strikes rather than 
traditional intelligence (Pincus, 2012). 
US intelligence is organized into two main programs: the National Intelligence Program 
(NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Some IC agencies fall neatly into one or 
the other program; in other areas, there is overlap. Until 2010 the total sum spent on these 
two programs was only sporadically released because the MIP portion was classified; 
following the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and budget authorization laws, the 
government disclosed that the total intelligence budget in 2010 was $80.1 billion, 
comprising $53.1 billion for the NIP and $27 billion for the MIP (ODNI, 2010; DOD, 2010). 
The nine years after 9/11 saw ramped-up intelligence efforts funded by a flood of money 
(Priest and Arkin, 2012). The current Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, 
has warned that intelligence budgets will decline “in the double digits, with a B (for 
billion)” over the next decade (Zakaria, 2011). The main IC contractor lobbying group, the 
Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) predicts there will be significant 
reductions in spending on national security (INSA, 2011). Total spending still far exceeds 
what it was prior to 9/11, however (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 about here 
INSA’s interest in the intelligence budget is a reflection of the concerns of its 150 corporate 
members who operate as contractors and form a “shadow IC” hand in hand with the official 
IC agencies. 
The Intelligence Contracting Nexus  
The history of private contractors’ involvement with the US military is very long, stretching 
back even to the Revolutionary War. More recently, the March 2003 invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Iraq dramatically increased the US military’s reliance on private 
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contractors in the battlefield itself (Gallaher, 2012). The role of private security contractors 
proved particularly controversial as it came to light that employees of contractors CACI 
International Inc., and Titan Corporation were involved in the torture of prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib prison and that employees of Blackwater USA killed civilians in Iraq (Bruneau, 
2011). 
Beyond the battlefield, there are many forms of military and intelligence contracting. 
“Commercial contractors” provide items such as heating, lighting, food, and IT support; 
“commodity contractors” provide equipment (e.g. satellites), while “core contractors” 
provide “direct technical, managerial, administrative support” (ODNI, 2009: 4). As of March 
2011, the DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq than uniformed 
personnel (Schwartz and Swain, 2011). Contracts may be structured in different ways, for 
example “Firm-Fixed-Price” or “Cost-Plus” which allow incentives and award fees. These 
are regulated through a 2000 page document known as the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
The amount of military contracting spending in the private sector, and its range of activities 
is staggering. Between FY2000 and FY 2012 the Department of Defense spent over $3.75 
trillion on contracts. Contractors range from massive corporations such as Lockheed-
Martin (recipient of over $293 billion in DOD contracts), to a large number of medium to 
small contractors such as GIS company Esri, which received a total of $806 million in 
contracts over that same period ($437 million from the DOD).3 In all, over 50,000 
companies hold contracts with the Defense Department. All states (and one in every two 
zip codes) received DOD contracting funds but the bulk of funding flows to half a dozen 
states, each having received over $1 trillion in contracts since 2000.  
Since the First Gulf War, the US’s increasing militarization has been achieved through 
outsourcing or contracting, in particular via the controversial Logistics Civilian 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The first LOGCAP contract (awarded in 1992 and worth 
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$815m) was to Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., (KBR) then a subsidiary of Halliburton (of which 
LOGCAP architect Dick Cheney was CEO, 1995-2000) (Shorrock, 2008; Schneider and Ricks, 
2000). Subsequent LOGCAPs have been awarded to DynCorp and Halliburton in 2001 
(Singer, 2003/2008). While in 1996 the Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing 
and Privatization cited savings of up to $7-12 billion annually resulting from privatization, 
it has become clear that without sufficient oversight, cost-plus contracts lead to significant 
waste and cost overruns in military contracting. 
There is no reason to think that intelligence contracting is without such problems. In the 
next section we examine in more detail how today’s patterns and practices of contracting in 
intelligence arose. 
Origins and Rise of Intelligence Contracting 
The modern history of IC contracting (in broadest terms the commercialization of 
government intelligence activities) begins at least two decades ago. Commercialization of 
geospatial imagery was a priority during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, as 
signaled by the passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 and the issuance of 
Presidential Directive-23 in 1994. Among other features, the Act transferred authority for 
the Landsat program (then the country’s premier unclassified remote sensing platform) to 
NASA and the DOD. It stated that “commercialization of land remote sensing should remain 
a long-term goal of US policy” and permitted for the first time the licensing of “private 
sector parties to operate remote sensing space systems” (HR 6133 §2). The 1994 
Presidential Directive’s fundamental goal was “to support and to enhance US industrial 
competitiveness” in remote sensing, a sector then estimated to reach $5-$15 billion by 
2000; a significant underestimate (Berger, 1994). 
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How big is the intelligence contracting industry? Shorrock (2008) has estimated that some 
70 percent of the IC budget is contracted out, but this figure is impossible to confirm and 
proportions are likely to vary by agency.4 In a highly unusual public act, the then Director 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Lt. Gen. Michael Maples revealed in 2004 that 
contractors accounted for 35 percent of the workforce in the DIA (Maples, 2004). In 2012, 
the NRO reported that contractors made up 63 percent of its workforce (NRO, 2011). We 
also know that the number of persons holding security clearances in this country exceeds 
4.8 million, including over 1.4 million Top Secret clearances (ODNI, 2011, 2012a) and that 
at least 1.07 million of these were held by contractors (~22 percent).5  
The use of contractors in intelligence is widespread, although as the overall growth in 
spending on intelligence slowed since 2010, debate over the more expensive contracts has 
sharpened. The Obama administration proposed cutting FY2013 funding for commercial 
imagery satellites in half to about $250 million from $540 million (Risen, 2012). These 
“drastic cutbacks to commercial imagery” have not met with approval in Congress. The 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) condemned “chaotic lurches” in government 
policy regarding geographical intelligence contracting, and chastised DNI Clapper for 
rejecting a proposal to meet intelligence imagery needs through commercial sources, which 
would have doubled imagery capacity (US SASC, 2012: 172). This unusually public 
disagreement revealed deep divisions between the military (who favor commercial 
imagery) and the intelligence community (which would like to save money by using the 
NRO) (Risen, 2012). Commercial imagery is not classified, and can be shared with allies. 
Currently, fully three quarters of NGA imagery needs are met through commercial remote 
sensing, amounting to 425 terabytes of data annually by 2012 (NGA, 2009). SASC continued 
by noting that the “wild swing” in government policy had the result that the stock price of 
GeoEye and DigitalGlobe “plummeted” (US SASC, 2012: 274) as Figure 2 shows. 
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Congressional concern with stock prices is far from being an oddity if understood in the 
context of the contracting nexus.  
The intelligence contracting nexus is part of what Priest and Arkin (2012) call an 
“alternative geography” of US intelligence; a “top-secret world” of intelligence and security 
in thousands of locations. This is a geography expressive of political power at a number of 
levels, with complex multiplier effects that are as much political as they are economic..  
FIGURE 2 about here 
NGA and the EnhancedView Contract 
By far the most expensive component of the intelligence community budget is satellite 
imagery.6 As the Senate Armed Services Committee’s deliberations demonstrate, there is 
debate about whether designing, building, launching and maintaining the fleet of 
surveillance satellites is best handled via contracting or not. In 2012, for example, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee admiringly cited the case of the SpaceX company, saying: 
“The US government has much to gain with the success of SpaceX” comparing the 
company’s results favorably to more expensive government satellite programs (US Senate 
2012b: 16). Several members of the Committee went on to express concern that the merger 
of GeoEye and DigitalGlobe “may result in the reduction of an American industrial base that 
creates high-tech jobs at home and has produced a nascent, yet innovative industry that 
has outpaced foreign competition” (US Senate 2012b: 21). Contracting for satellite imagery 
has become a feature of the political landscape recognized by elected officials. 
The NGA is the country’s main geographical intelligence agency, the world’s largest user of 
GIS, and is responsible for coordinating intelligence satellite imagery (satellite deployment 
is handled by the NRO). Set up in 2003, and merging several existing agencies, the NGA’s 
primary mission is combat support of military operations. The NGA’s creation enabled the 
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solidification of   “an innovative and sophisticated new discipline that then NGA director 
James Clapper formally christened as geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT” (NGA, 2011a).7 
Today, the NGA employs approximately 16,000 people, about two-thirds of whom work at 
the newly opened headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Built at a cost of $2.55 billion, the 
facility is the largest project by the Army Corps of Engineers since the completion of the 
Pentagon in 1943 and is the third largest facility in the National Capital Region.8 The NGA 
has four other facilities (Springfield, VA, St. Louis, MO, Arnold, MO, and Gila Bend, AZ). The 
budget of the NGA is classified, but estimates range from $3-5 billion annually (Shorrock, 
2008). According to Shorrock (2008: 184), “about half” the NGA employees are contractors. 
We have traced $6,756,564,435 in spending by the NGA between 2000 and 2006, 
comprising 11,831 contracts, 486 grants and 3 “other.” The companies most frequently 
contracted with were DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (ranks 1, 2) with GIS company Esri at rank 
10. Beginning with FY 2007 the NGA received permission to withhold the amount and 
number of contracts it has. Thus, FY 2006 is the last date figures are officially available, and 
in that year NGA outsourced over $1.4 billion. However, it is possible to gain a partial 
picture of NGA contracting by using financial reports submitted to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and by using government bidding data on contracts issued by 
the NGA when they are made public.9 Using FBO data we can track, albeit imperfectly, NGA 
contracting activity after the 2006 cut-off date, as shown in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 about here 
As can be seen, the NGA has continued its pattern of contracting after 2006. Although dollar 
amounts are not consistently available for these bids, the NGA issues several hundred 
contracts a year, which indicates a robust contracting commitment of over $1 billion per 
year. Although this is liable to continue to decline as the 9/11 largesse is reined in, the 
award in 2010 of the EnhancedView contract (probably the NGA’s single largest contract) 
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indicates that there remained considerable funding and policy approval for outsourcing 
geographical intelligence. Critically, Congress also specified in the FY 2013 Defense 
Authorization Bill that the Secretary of Defense and DNI shall “sustain” the EnhancedView 
program capacity (although not necessarily the funds) previously approved (US Congress, 
2012a, 324). 
The original EnhancedView contract was awarded in August 2010 jointly to GeoEye and 
DigitalGlobe for a total sum of $7.3 billion. Both were fairly small companies with histories 
of involvement in intelligence contracting and the construction, launch and maintenance of 
surveillance satellites. GeoEye (formerly Space Imaging and ORBIMAGE) was best known 
for its IKONOS and GeoEye -1 satellites. DigitalGlobe (formerly EarthWatch) was known 
for, among other things, providing the high resolution imagery to Keyhole Corporation, 
which became GoogleEarth. See Table 1.  
TABLE 1 about here 
The EnhancedView program was a response to the failed “Future Imagery Architecture” 
(FIA) plan, canceled by the government in 2005 after prime contractor Boeing went well 
over budget and behind schedule. The failure of FIA seriously damaged the NRO and its 
mission partner, the NGA, and left the United States with significantly outdated technology. 
The commercialization of satellite imagery meant that imagery provided by the NRO could 
be integrated through a Commercial Remote Sensing System (CRSS) known as the “two-
plus-two” strategy (Brinton, 2009). Under this compromise strategy the NRO would buy 
and operate two “exquisite-class spy satellites” (KH-11s with electro-optical imaging) to be 
built by Lockheed Martin,10 and the NGA would buy data from commercial vendors 
equivalent to the output of two spacecraft (Brinton, 2009). This agreement appeared to 
settle the commercial imagery policy debate until looming budget reductions in FY 2013 
reopened it. 
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The EnhancedView award to DigitalGlobe and GeoEye came as no surprise. In many ways, 
these two companies are the market in the US.11 The GeoEye award was especially 
unsurprising: James R. Clapper, the former Director of the NGA and now DNI was a member 
of its Board of Directors in 2006-2007. Both DigitalGlobe and GeoEye had previously 
received contracts from the NGA through its Commercial Remote Sensing (CRS) program. 
These included the ClearView and NextView contracts of 2003, which were directed at 
investing in higher-resolution imagery (at least 0.5 meter panchromatic or black and 
white), and were worth some $146.4 million per year to each company (Ferster, 2010). 
EnhancedView represented significant sales of satellite imagery worth some $150 million 
per year for GeoEye, which would have increased to $183.6 million per year following 
successful launch of GeoEye-2. NGA also agreed to pay GeoEye $337 million to help develop 
GeoEye-2. However, following the merger, GeoEye-2 will be mothballed in favor of 
WorldView 3, a DigitalGlobe satellite with much lower resolution built by Ball Aerospace. 
(The company plans to spend $230 million on the satellite in 2013 on projected revenues 
of $635-$660 million.) It is unclear how much NGA has already paid out for GeoEye-2. 
GeoEye-1 currently offers an industry-best resolution of 0.41 meters, but is enjoined by law 
from publicly selling imagery below 0.5 meters in resolution. GeoEye has superior imagery 
resolution that can reveal finer details on the ground, but DigitalGlobe has superior 
coverage (it claims its image library constitutes 80 percent of all commercial imagery). In 
reality, no satellite-based technical capability will satisfy the nation’s surveillance 
requirements, a point we return to later in this article. 
Even without the merger between the two companies, it is abundantly clear that they are 
heavily dependent on government for their profitability—and the government is heavily 
dependent upon them. Prior to the merger, the firms’ percentage of total revenue from 
government contracts ranged from 51—77 percent. According to SEC filings, GeoEye 
received 64 percent of its total revenue in FY2011 directly from the US government (the 
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remainder is earned through sales to commercial resellers and foreign government 
agencies). DigitalGlobe reported in FY2011 an even higher proportion; 77 percent of its 
revenues came from US government (defense and intelligence) sources. Dependence on 
government contracts was much lower in 2005 (51 and 62 percent respectively). Following 
the merger DigitalGlobe reports that half its revenue is still government-derived (two-
thirds of this from EnhancedView). With the onset of EnhancedView, almost all government 
contracting in this sector is brought together under a single contract. In FY2011 96.5 
percent of the companies’ government contract revenue was received via the 
EnhancedView contract. This explains why the stock market reacts nervously to any sign of 
decreased EnhancedView funding. Figures 5 and 6 indicate the share of funding to GeoEye 
and DigitalGlobe from the NGA and from government sources as a whole. The NGA, for its 
part, can only fulfill its need for high volumes of detailed satellite imagery by contracting 
out to these companies. 
FIGURE 4 about here  
FIGURE 5 about here 
The wider implications of the contractor nexus for our understanding of state power and 
the geoeconomics of the US military are several. First, the co-dependence of the contracting 
firms and the project of intelligence undermines any idea that there is a “market” for 
satellite imagery. Instead, there are very few companies who enjoy a cosy relationship with 
a small number of government procurement offices, blurring any assumed lines between 
government and private corporations. Second, the mixture of interests and secrecy 
represented in this nexus threaten the liberal democratic principles of US political life. The 
revolving door between government, the military, the IC, and private contractors raises 
serious conflicts of interest (US Senate, 2012c). Third, intelligence contracting is 
symptomatic of the massive redistribution and consolidation of class power that Harvey 
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characterizes as central to US neoliberal capitalism. In 2007 it was estimated that 
contractors absorb all taxes paid by everyone with incomes under $100,000, some 90 
percent of all US taxpayers (Bartlett and Steele, 2007), an unaccountable and opaque fiscal 
form of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2007: 178). Fourth, the nexus is 
territorialized. The fortunes of whole regions are caught in the contractor regime (Priest 
and Arkin, 2012; Lutz, 2011). We return to this point in the next section on the “knowledge 
nexus”. 
Human Geography and the Intelligence Knowledge Nexus 
The knowledge nexus is intertwined with the contracting nexus; they are different aspects 
of the same developing complex. The knowledge nexus (like the contracting nexus) 
includes state agencies, components of the intelligence community, and the US military. 
The knowledge nexus also includes public and quasi-public entities including some 
affiliated with universities, as well as private entities, firms and organizations, and research 
groups or think tanks (such as the influential Center for New American Security, funded by 
an array of contractors and the US military), all of which are staffed by increasing numbers 
of back office “war workers” (Lutz, 2011). In this technical and managerial nexus (Shaw, 
2012), there arises a specific political-economic form in which spatially competent 
technological workers exert disproportionate influence in “code-space” (Thrift, 2004: 600; 
see also; Kitchin and Dodge, 2011). 
The knowledge nexus has evolved as part of the shift in policy and doctrine noted earlier. 
While there may be a tendency to over-emphasize the break, the shift from “regular” to 
“irregular” warfare—a type of war in which the US’s main task is counterinsurgency 
(COIN)—was significant. The official doctrinal document marking this shift was the Army 
and Marine Field Manual, known by its title: Counterinsurgency (US Dept. of the Army, 
2007). Early COIN entailed a refocus from “kinetic” firepower to a strategy aimed at 
working with local populations to win “hearts and minds.” While COIN was often promoted 
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as less costly than kinetic warfare, it may be better understood as a redirection of economic 
flows, since it has relied on a vast expansion of contracting. As of March 2011, the DOD had 
more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq than uniformed personnel, according to 
the Congressional Report Service (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). COIN enrolled geographers 
and others directly, since it entailed familiarity with the languages and dialects, social 
orders, and customs of local populations. As much as they needed data from satellites, 
aircrafts, drones, or ground sensors, commanders also required detailed area experts with 
“insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes 
of individuals and groups” (US Dept. of the Army, 2007: 80). In sum, it was argued that 
“successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society 
and culture within which they are conducted” (US Dept. of the Army, 2007: 40, emphasis 
added). 
During the late 2000s scholars challenged one small component of the “cultural turn” COIN 
signaled. Known as the Human Terrain System (HTS), this experimental “intelligence 
support” program was founded in 2007 to train civilians at Fort Leavenworth 
(headquarters of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC) for tours of duty 
embedded with troops—initially in Iraq and then in Afghanistan (Military Intelligence 
Professional Bulletin, 2011; Price, 2011). In 2010 HTS became a permanent DOD program 
funded at about $150 million annually (McFate and Fondacaro, 2011; Hamilton, 2011). The 
HTS exemplifies the blurred distinctions between military and civilian with some 
academics becoming geographical intelligence contractors, whose research directly 
“supports military decision-making” (Hamilton, 2011: n.p.). The work of civilian social 
scientists in the service of battlefield commanders has been controversial (AAA, 2007).  
Nonetheless, not only has the HTS program been made permanent, it has expanded with 
about 31 teams of 5-8 personnel currently deployed in Afghanistan (Hamilton, 2011). 
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The American Geographical Society’s Bowman Expeditions also came out of Fort 
Leavenworth (with funding from the Fort Leavenworth-based Foreign Military Studies 
Office) and, though they are not institutionally connected to the HTS (Dobson, 2009), they 
echo the HTS language in their claim to produce “digital human terrain” mappings (Herlihy 
et al., 2008; Demarest, 1998). Bowman Expedition leaders see “human terrain […] at the 
very core of geographic scholarship” (Herlihy et al., 2008) and their project has involved 
dozens of academic geographers from at least nine US universities (Wainwright, 2013). The 
NGA’s own in-house training program in Human Geography treats Human Geography in a 
similar fashion, seeing it as amassing social data to produce mappings of human terrain 
(NGA, 2011b). Yet as notorious as the HTS and Bowman Expeditions have become, they are 
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the imbrication of geography in the 
contemporary world of intelligence.  
In fact, intelligence based on areal expertise about  ”human terrain” is a type of GEOINT 
that is being rapidly overshadowed by a different type of geographical knowledge. The 
current era is one in which there is a tremendous growth in remote and technical “back 
office” GEOINT aimed at processing the vast amounts of data generated by a proliferating 
aerial sensor regime. It is through the enormous, and largely contracted, efforts of spatial 
analysts to develop sophisticated processing technologies to turn satellite, spy plane, and 
drone image feeds into useable intelligence that geographical knowledges have assumed an 
even more central, if shadowy, role in the political economy of US intelligence in the 
contemporary era. 
GEOINT and Moving Targets 
In order to understand how geographical knowledges currently are being enrolled and 
developed in the IC, we identify two aspects of the evolving knowledge nexus through 
which its form and implications may be identified. First, there has been a shift in GEOINT 
from an understanding of spatial data as locational and static to one where space is not so 
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much a plane of discrete identified locations, but rather a field of motion. Movement is now 
the overarching motif of GEOINT’s geographical imagination. By those inside GEOINT, this 
is sometimes described as a paradigm change from “Feature based GEOINT” to “Activity 
based GEOINT” understood as part of a more general doctrine of Activity Based Intelligence 
(ABI) (Biltgen and Tomes, 2010). It is not that the precision-science of pinpointing accurate 
absolute locations has gone away, because the new activity based GEOINT is itself based on 
such knowledge and technologies. Activity based GEOINT is, to use Thrift’s phrasing, not “in 
opposition to the grid of calculation” of the earlier feature and location based GEOINT, but 
rather is “an outgrowth of the new capacities that it brings into existence” (Thrift, 2004: 
598).  
The political economy of this is undergirded by the runaway technological abilities of 
proliferating sensors and their aerial carriers or “platforms” (satellites, UAVs, drones), 
which are generating and delivering more and more data. The range of sensors now 
deployed includes electro-optical and infrared [EO/IR] sensors, synthetic aperture radars, 
and sensors that can detect chemicals or radiation (CBRN sensors). Data from well-known 
drones such as the Predator and Reaper joins data coming from sensors on UAV helicopters 
such as the A-160 Hummingbird, lower altitude small drones such as Wasps and Ravens, 
higher altitude sensors, such as those attached U-2 spy planes and to long-endurance UAVs 
such as the Global Hawk, and from those in space (from satellites and from Boeing X-37 
spacecraft, for example). All these are elements in what Alfred McCoy identifies as a “triple 
canopy” (McCoy, 2012) of weaponized surveillance capacity, stretching vertically from the 
earth’s surface through the stratosphere to outer space (Cheseboro, 2011; and see Elden, 
2012 on vertical geopolitics; Adey, Whitehead and Williams, 2011). See Figure 6. 
Unprecedented amounts of data from sensors are pouring into the IC. The New York Times 
reported, for example, that the amount of data collected only by US Air Force drones over 
Afghanistan tripled between 2007 and 2009, swamping analysts (Drew, 2010).  
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Figure 6  
This vertically-stacked, proliferating sensor regime is key among the rapidly developing 
technologies aimed at realizing Wide Area Persistent Surveillance (WAPS). Persistent 
Surveillance is understood to be a potentially “transformational” capacity to achieve “near 
perfect knowledge” that will “remove uncertainty” even as its proponents in the IC admit 
that “[p]ersistent surveillance in its objective form does not exist today” (Pendall, 2005: 41; 
see also Williams, 2011).  Achieving the utopian project of Persistent Surveillance or the so-
called “unblinking eye” is a priority of the GEOINT community. 
And it is here that geographical knowledges are really being put to work. In the process 
they are being rapidly refashioned, as complex fast-flowing streams of spatial data that are 
sorted and re-sorted, made interoperable, and mapped as surfaces that can show not just 
locations, but can track movements. The problem is not so much to find a needle in a 
haystack. Rather, the issue is how to track thousands of moving needles in haystacks that 
themselves are not static, and to identify which needles are likely to pose a threat (and thus 
the “needles” are always potential targets, a point we come back to below). As US Army 
Maj. General Pendall put it, the idea behind WAPS is that “the targeted entity will be unable 
to move, hide, disperse, deceive, or otherwise break contact with the focused intelligence 
system” (Pendall, 2005: 41). 
In GEOINT, the emphasis is on software that can integrate and parse the incoming data into 
actionable spatial intelligence by discriminating among billions of movements to identify 
those that are suspicious. The analysis of a dense field of complex, fast, moving elements; of 
networks, connections, disconnections, reconnections, joinings and splittings, demands 
discrimination. To sort out which movements, which elements, and which dynamic 
networks are of interest is a necessary first step in tracing or tracking. This is the project of 
“activity recognition” enabled by automated “moving object detection and tracking” 
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systems. Also called “nodal analysis,” such geographical work is designed to make a 
“shadowy foe” more “visible and vulnerable” by revealing “patterns of life” and thus taking 
him or her from being a “foe” hiding in the shadows to a visible target (Flynn, Juergens and 
Cantrell, 2008: 56; see also Adey et al., 2011 and Amoore, 2009). 
These efforts are visual and cartographic, but also fundamentally algorithmic (Amoore, 
2009). They are very much in line with Thrift’s identification of  contemporary  society as 
“in thrall to a security-entertainment complex, an era of permanent and pervasive war and 
permanent and pervasive entertainment, both sharing the linked values of paranoiac 
vigilance…and the correct identification of the potential of each moment” (Thrift, 2011: 11, 
emphasis added). 
Intelligence contractors are exploiting synergies between security and entertainment 
technologies and are rapidly developing sophisticated tagging and tracing softwares that 
can geocode, sort, and recombine the huge amounts of data arriving from the skies. Related 
synergies with the data mining industry have received particular attention because it 
appears that the use of commercial data aggregators by the IC is widespread (Calabrese, 
2012). Under new rules announced in March 2012, established by the US Attorney General, 
the DNI, and the NTSC, the latter may search data on US and non-US citizens merely if it 
says it involves terrorism (Calabrese, 2012). 
Spatial Analysis: Patterns of Life and Signature Strikes  
Pattern of Life Analysis merges and sorts spatial and temporal data and produces 
understandable simplified visual representations that can be the basis for decision and 
action. Included in a basic Pattern of Life analysis would be information about a person’s 
daily everyday movements, their “frequented locations”, their interactions with “family and 
associates” and their “personal habits” all of which is used to “predict a person’s behavior 
based on habit or schedule” and to recognize any deviations from these routines (phrases 
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from Mason, Foss, and Lam, 2011). It is possible, for example, to delimit a “geofence” and 
then tracking analysis would “detect when people, assets, or vehicles go outside an 
allowable area or enter a restricted area” (Esri, 2012). As Crandall has observed, “Tracking 
is an anticipatory form of seeing – a form of seeing that is always ahead of itself” (Crandall, 
2005: 20). Complex geoprocessing capabilities are being developed that can conduct 
operations that build upon a merger of geospatial referencing and basic GIS with network 
analysis and predictive analysis (NGA, 2011b: 6; see also Crandall, 2010). The mode and 
purpose of surveillance has shifted from the posture of the “unblinking eye” to the “smart 
eye” that pays attention to “the frequency of change” in network topologies and their 
constituent traffic (see Defense Science Board, 2011, Table 4). 
This is sophisticated spatial analysis; the kind of geographical knowledge creation and 
application that firms such as Esri are keen to take on (Mason, Foss, and Lam, 2011; 
Mollenkopf, 2012). Contractors, as well as other elements of the IC knowledge nexus, are 
busy inventing and refining moving object detection and patterns of life analytics or 
“devices” that produce the inscriptions that, in turn, produce the targets demanded by the 
US war machine. “[A]n inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular 
configurations of such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or 
diagram” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 51). GEOINT is formed through a series of inscription 
devices, then, from aerial sensors, transmitters, analytical software, and the standard map 
or “specialized product” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012) to the drone pilot or the field 
commander. The step of enrolling a human decision maker may be by-passed, as visual 
tracking analytic systems can be self-learn to alter the “rules” under which events trigger 
actions (Crandall, 2010). Given that tracking systems themselves are embedded in and 
enabling of “kill chains” that involve “humanoid” robotic weapons, this is especially 
alarming (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
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Pattern of Life analysis allows the practice known as “signature strikes”. Such killings are of 
persons whose identity is not known and are differentiated from “personality strikes” 
when the targets’ identities are known. Signature strikes are justified because they are 
understood to be aimed at “people whose actions over time have made it obvious that they 
are a threat” (US official, quoted in Cloud, 2010), in other words, human beings who have 
been rendered into targets by geospatial tracking and pattern of life analysis. Though 
officially neither confirmed nor denied, signature strikes have become increasingly 
common under Obama’s kill-capture policy (Becker and Shane, 2012). 
The spatial analysis that is central to GEOINT is a joined-up geography done far away from 
the battlefield. Activity-based intelligence and pattern of life analytics turn the deluge of 
data into instrumental spatialized knowledge through the technological capacity of 
contracted analysts. This work relies less on areal specialists in the field (as in the earlier 
phase of COIN) and more on technologies and analysts in ordinary corporate and 
government offices. These back office geographical war-workers (Lutz, 2011) may be found 
throughout the US, but there are undoubtedly concentrations of them in particular regions 
such as Northern Virginia and Maryland. 
The so-called “surgical” strikes that form an increasing centerpiece to the Obama 
administration could not be performed otherwise. Joining multiple forms of geographical 
knowledges (GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) permits both the sorting and discrimination and 
the targeting and killing. As Pentagon advisor Lt. Col John Nagl has explained: 
“Counterinsurgency doctrine believes in killing people, it just believes in killing the right 
people” (Nagl, in Frontline, 2011). 
Locating enemies makes the “disposition matrix”, as the kill list is now called, actionable. 
The knowledge nexus we are discussing turns a list or a matrix into a “coherent picture”, 
transforming a material substance into a compelling image that at once permits action to be 
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taken and justified (see Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 51). The list or matrix, as a geospatial 
product, becomes an “operational menu”; “a single, continually evolving database in which 
biographies, locations, known associates and affiliated organizations are all catalogued. So 
are strategies for taking targets down, including extradition requests, capture operations 
and drone patrols” (Miller, 2012: n.p.). The disposition matrix is compiled by the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a secret and largely unaccountable agency (part of the 
DNI), and is the basis for weekly meetings at the White House. Investments in streamlining 
the kill-capture policy are solidifying trends towards “a surveillance state” centered on a 
“secretive, unaccountable judicial body that analyzes who you are and then decrees what 
should be done with you, how you should be ‘disposed’ of, beyond the reach of any minimal 
accountability or transparency” (Greenwald, 2012: n.p.). 
GEOINT and the knowledge nexus are calculative practices of government. Like other 
calculative practices, notably insurance, this is a practice of risk management (not 
elimination) in this case designed to minimize risk to US military operatives and their 
allies. And, like insurance, patterns of life calculations are probabilistic, calculating the 
probable outcomes of current and past patterns. GEOINT thus is an “anticipatory” 
intelligence (Anderson, 2011), committed to rendering human lives into patterns of life and 
to the production of operationable inscriptions that offer predictive analysis (JCOS, 2012: 
IV-9). If for Gregory “cultural knowledge [is] not a substitute for killing but rather, in 
certain circumstances, a prerequisite for its refinement” (2008: 9) the same is true for the 
probabilistic and calculative forms of geographical knowledge currently being generated in 
the IC knowledge nexus. 
There are constant flows of people and ideas in and out of the IC agencies and commercial 
GEOINT contractors. Academic geography is part of this. Several US geography 
departments have developed curricula in intelligence; for example, at Brigham Young 
University, “Geospatial Intelligence” is one of six possible undergraduate tracks. 
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Prospective students are informed that the track will prepare them for jobs with “federal 
intelligence agencies, military, private contractors” (Brigham Young University, 2012). 
GEOINT Certificates accredited by the US Geospatial Intelligence Foundation (USGIF) 
include those offered at George Mason, Penn State, University of Texas at Dallas, and 
University of Missouri. The NGA recently awarded $443,000 to Fayetteville State University 
to develop one there. The USGIF’s academic advisory board includes members from 
government, academe, and IC contractors (USGIF, 2012).  
Despite the claims of some (e.g., Dobson, 2009), the enrolment of “cultural” approaches and 
the associated emphasis on more robust human geographical areal knowledge in earlier 
phases of COIN cannot be understood as part of some more humane or less violent 
approach to war and national security (Belcher, 2012; Gregory, 2008, 2010). Likewise, 
though it may result in fewer US military casualties, the work of geographical knowledges 
in producing the intelligence that undergirds the production of the disposition matrix and 
enables the kill/capture program, can in no way be understood as somehow removed from 
culpability for the thousands of documented killings of civilians, including children, that 
have occurred under this program (Benjamin, 2012; Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
2012). 
 
Conclusion: Protecting the Secret Surveillant State 
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of 
openness in Government. … Openness will strengthen our democracy and 
promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government (Obama, 2009). 
In addition to tracing the contours of a consolidating political economy of the US 
intelligence industry, undertaking this research has highlighted troubling trends regarding 
government openness. In December 2007 the Pentagon instituted new regulations, which 
dramatically decreased oversight of unclassified information about intelligence 
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contracting. A new online public database on contracting expenditures (USAspending.gov) 
is incomplete; several defense intelligence agencies—the NGA, the DIA and the 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)—received permission to opt out of reporting their 
contracts, even though they had reported this information previously (Aftergood, 2007). 
Since 2006 the NGA has not reported even on its unclassified contracting activities. 
Government over-classification of “secrets” is widely acknowledged to be rampant, and 
declassification deadlines are routinely missed.12 
At a time when new coalitions of interest are emerging around the political economy of 
intelligence, decreases in public accountability are disturbing. The increasing alignment of 
the interests of contractors, government agencies, universities, and even – given the 
agglomerations that characterize the geography of contract dollars’ destinations – elected 
officials, certainly raises the stakes for oversight. But the Obama administration has 
aggressively prosecuted whistleblowers including Thomas Drake (NSA) and Jeffrey Sterling 
(CIA), using the 1917 Espionage Act. In early 2013 Bradley Manning entered a plea bargain 
with the government admitting he had leaked state department cables and the “Collateral 
murder” video footage to WikiLeaks. Ironically, the only people prosecuted for alleged 
waterboarding by the CIA are those who brought it to light, not those who may have 
carried it out. In the FY2013 Intelligence Authorization Act Congress also considered giving 
agency heads power to deny pensions to persons considered to have violated 
nondisclosure agreements, without specifying the standard for that determination. The 
suggestion was dropped after Senator Ron Wyden placed a hold on the bill (Aftergood, 
2012a, 2012b).  
The Intelligence Committee itself rarely holds public hearings, and did not do so for these 
new provisions. A senior NRO official is facing a criminal investigation over contracting 
practices (Taylor, 2012). In the mid-1990s, the NRO’s director and deputy director were 
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fired over accounting irregularities, but information that would allow the public to know 
about these recent developments is not available.  
Of larger concern, the once controversial Patriot Act was quietly renewed in 2011 and 
contains many provisions for secretly collecting information within the United States. 
Oversight agencies, such as the FISA Court, rarely report publicly. Congress has 
consistently refused to allow non-sensitive FISA information to be available, including 
information on the wiretapping of US citizens (a challenge to this by the ACLU was denied 
by the Supreme Court in February 2013). Also unknown is whether activities such as 
warrantless wiretapping by the NSA (codenamed “Ragtime” by the NSA), which the Bush 
administration was forced to confirm following a 2005 report in the New York Times (Risen 
and Lichtblau, 2005), are still continuing. The government reserves the right to conduct 
sweeping searches and issue “National Security Letters” (which come with a gag order) 
under the Patriot Act, but ordinary citizens can know very little about the activities of the 
intelligence community.13 In July 2012 the government admitted to Sen. Ron Wyden for the 
first time that the constitutional privacy rights of Americans were violated on at least one 
occasion by domestic surveillance but provided no details (ODNI, 2012c). 
Abroad, the Obama administration is routinizing the kill/capture program and has claimed 
the right to kill people, including US citizens, without trial, charge or evidence (e.g. the 
assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki and, in a separate drone strike, his 16-year old son).  
Geographical knowledge underpins kill/capture, as do the growing surveillance drone and 
sensor industries, but given the current trends to protect such activities from scrutiny, the 
needed critical analysis of such industries is likely to face difficulties of the sorts we faced 
in our analysis of NGA contracts after 2006. A widely accepted definition of intelligence is 
that it reduces uncertainty (Fingar, 2011); the irony of this definition is that the intelligence 
community, which spends billions of dollars of public money each year, is one of the least 
knowable of human enterprises. As we have argued, a key trend in this shadowy world of 
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the political economy of intelligence is the militarization and corporatization of geography 
knowledges that is far more extensive than previously acknowledged.  
Regarding the extensive nature of intelligence contracting documented in this paper, we 
are not arguing, as some do, that the state is weakening its power because of outsourcing 
(Stanger, 2009). Nor are we arguing that capital is simply seeking to exploit the state to 
address its own crises of accumulation. Rather, the state is complicit in what Hannah calls a 
shift in “epistemic sovereignty” (Hannah, 2010). There is a tremendous transfer and 
concentration of wealth in the hands of contractors, on the one hand, and on the other little 
or no concern for the limits of this market, either in terms of environmental or human well-
being, nor (from its perspective) the insecurities it may bring. As such, it may be that these 
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TABLE 1: Duopoly or monopoly? 
 DIGITAL GLOBE GEOEYE 
Rank, value of NGA contracts 
2011 
1 2 
Number of employees, Q1 
2012 
708 743 
Market capitalization, $ 
millions, Q1 2012 
747.57 423.52 
Headquarters Longmont, CO Herndon, VA 
Color imagery library, 
coverage in km2 
2.2 billion 650 million 
Percentage of total revenue 
from contracts, FY 2011 
77 64 
Value of Enhanced View 
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1 Despite its name, no captures are known to date in over 400 covert drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 3,000 and 4,600 people have been 
killed in those countries. 
2The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) contains the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) and oversees the National Intelligence Program (NIP).  
3 Data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). For a fuller discussion of DOD 
contracting, see Turse (2008). 
4 In an interview in 2008, the Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital confirmed there 
are around 100,000 government personnel in the IC and another 37,000 “core” contractors. He estimated the 
cost per civilian government worker at $125,000 and $207,000 per contractor (Sanders, 2008). If correct, 
that would indicate an IC salary budget of approximately $20 billion per year. 
5 The number is at least this high because the government was unable to categorize 327,000 clearances as 
either a government employee or contractor (ODNI, 2012a). 
6 A 1996 report revealed that the NRO funding levels were six times that of the Defense Mapping Agency (as 
the NGA was called at the time), and twice as much as that of the CIA and NSA (Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, 1996). 
7 Title 10 USC §467 defines GEOINT as “exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to 
describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth.”  
8 The move was part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure and suffered significant cost over-runs of 128 
percent (GAO, 2012). 
9 For example, in 2004 the NGA issued a presolicitation for a Global Geospatial Intelligence contract with Esri, 
to extend through January 2013. This was apparently for the PALENTERRA software and database that has 
been implemented for the USGS National Map. 
10 According to satellite observers, the first KH-11 to launch since 2005 was NRO L-49 on January 20, 2011 
(Ray, 2011).  
11 See http://www.spacenews.com/earth_observation/enhancedview-awards-carefully-structured.html 
12In 2012 the US government spent about $13 billion on protecting classified information, double the amount 
a decade ago (Shane, 2012). 
13 Some Senators, notably Paul (R-KY) and Wyden (D-OR) have raised objections to the search powers of the 
Patriot Act—Paul held up the renewal vote for several days in 2011. In March 2013 Sen. Paul filibustered the 
nomination of John O. Brennan to Director of the CIA for almost 13 hours in protest at the administration’s 
lack of transparency over its legal authorities to use UAVs to kill individuals. 
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Figure 1. Total intelligence spending 1997-2013 (2012 and 2013 are requested budgets; DoD declined to 
release FY2012 requested MIP). Sources: Data for 2005 are imputed from a DIA document posted online, 
see Chapter 1 of Shorrock (2008). Data for 1994 were mistakenly published by a Congressional committee. 
Other years see DoD (2010, 2012) and ODNI (2010, 2012b).  
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Figure 2. Stock prices of GeoEye and DigitalGlobe, 2010-2012. Source: Google Finance.  
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Figure 3. NGA spending and number of contract bids. Source: Federal Procurement Database (fpdb.gov) and 
Federal Business Opportunities Database (fbo.gov).  
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Figure 4. GeoEye sources of funding, FY2004-2011. Source: SEC.  
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Figure 5. DigitalGlobe sources of funding, FY2005-2011. Source: SEC.  
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Figure 6. The "triple canopy" of drone and satellite coverage. Source: Cheseboro 2011.  
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